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Between Convergence and Exceptionalism:  
A 1867-1920 
 
Between the late 1860s and the aftermath of the First World War, American discourse about 
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Th ions, between the emergence of the ‘labor problem’ in the 1860s and its 
ap er the First World War, American thinking on labor relations was 
fre uently comparative. Americans seeking to understand the origins and nature of, and 
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mericans and the British Model of Labor Relations, c. 
e ‘labor problem’ – relations among workers, unions, employers, and the state – was 
rmeated by comparisons.  Reformers looked especially toward Britain, the first industrial 
tion, for clues about how to build an industrial relations system. This article explores how 
e generations of American employers reflected on what Britain’s experience with 
latively strong, recognized, legally secure unions could teach about how to handle the 
allenge of American labor.  Their interest was serious, sustained if discontinuous.  It was 
ost important at key moments of decision in the early 1900s and in 1918-1919 when the 
pen Shop was first built, and then refurbished and defended.  Examination of their 
derstanding and representations of the British model of labor relations aids our 
preciation of the ideological framework within which they conceived and constructed the 
erican Way.  
rough three generat
parent resolution aft
q
lutions to the labor problem often looked eastward toward Britain, the first industrial 
tion. U.S. perceptions of and reactions to the British model of labor relations through these 
ubled years shed light on both the influence of other nations' example on U.S. social 
and the related question of the uniqueness or otherwise of the distinctive American 
odel of workers' self-organization and labor politics which emerged.1  
The period during which Americans were interested in Britain's developing industrial 
lations system as a model can be dated quite precisely.2  It began in the late 1860s, during 
e first post-Civil War peak in trade union activity.  As some Americans sought solutions to 
bor unrest, they discovered that Britain had been down this rocky road before and had
 to smooth it out.  A Royal Commission on Trade Unions sat in Britain from 
oring the place of unions within industry and before the law.  Its findings were 
ell publicized, as was the example of successful local boards of arbitration between 
ployers and labor in a growing number of comparatively well-organized trades.  The 
ssons of British experience were relayed to Americans through the labor press and via a 
 re.  After the 1877 crisis, Congress appointed a committee, under the Democrats’ 
y leader, Abram Hewitt of New York, to look into the labor problem in the 
nited States.  A large-scale entrepreneur in the coal, iron, and steel industries, Hewitt was a 
rsonal incarnation of the transatlantic industrial revolution-- his father was a member of the 
ecting crew of English mechanics who arrived in 1794 with the first steam-engine in 
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-and-lecture trip in 1870 by two Liberal MPs, friends of labor and apostles of 
nciliation.  Thomas Hughes was a Christian socialist, pioneer of workers’ education, and 
vocate of the cooperative movement; Anthony Mundella a lifelong radical and self-made 
ptain of industry, a progressive employer who had established the first successful board of 
bitration in England.  Both were in the forefront of the campaign to establish a secure legal 
atus for British trades unions, Hughes as a member of the pro-labor minority on the Royal 
mmission.  They had name recognition and some credibility in the United States -- Brown 
uthor of Tom Brown’s Schooldays (1857), a best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic; 
th of them thanks to their ardent advocacy of the Union cause during the Civil War and the 
storation of good Anglo-American relations thereafter.3 
According to Clifton Yearley, there were two central themes in their message: first, 
at ‘the more successfully unions were organized and able to carry on
s their relations” with employers, the less likely it became that anyone would start 
sty, violent, or unlawful action.’ British unions therefore ‘won a vote of confidence from 
 nation at large and many in the governing class.’  These strong and secure unions became 
nservative, and were thus excellent models for their fledgling American brethren in the 
bulent post-Civil War years.  Second, those unions and the employers they dealt with, 
sisted by members of the local bourgeoisie, had found a route to social peace via union 
cognition and the development of voluntaristic, non-conflictual dispute settlement systems.  
merican unions aspiring to the same status as their British brethren and operating in a far 
ore hostile environment, or middle-class Americans concerned about the resulting problem 
labor conflict, could adopt the same techniques.  As the Chicago Daily News commented 
 1874, ‘Great Britain has proved the truth of the theory [of arbitration].  America can 
nfidently and easily adopt it.’4 
Between the Molly Maguires troubles in the Anthracite District, and the great national 
lroad strike of 1877, developments which made the labor problem far more urgent, 
overnor Hartranft of Pennsylvania in 1876 sent Joseph Weeks, associate editor of the Iron 
e (the heavy industries' main trade jour
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erica, imported from their employers, Boulton & Watt of Birmingham; he stayed on to 
lp build the first American-made engines.  In 1867, while travelling in Europe, Hewitt had 
stified to the British Royal Commission, where he emphasized that ‘between the trades’ 
ions of Great Britain and those in the United States there is undoubtedly a strong analogy 
t … your organizations are more perfect than ours, and have arrived at a more complete 
velopment.’6  He supported the Hughes-Mundella tour – both of them were personal 
iends of his -- the high point of which was an all-ticket public lecture at Cooper Union 
ch Hewitt’s father-in-law Peter Cooper funded, and at which ‘the respectability and 
telligence of New York’ including ‘a large audience of working men’ were present in 
rce.7   
Weeks and Hewitt reached the same, predictable conclusions: that these matters were 
ndled muc
 conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes, together with the responsible 
ionism on which they depended.8  In offering this advice, they followed closely in the 
tsteps of one of the first comprehensive studies of the labor problem, authored by Edward 
oung, chair of the U.S. Bureau of Statistics, whose Labor in Europe and America (1875) 
erred to trade unions only in the sections dealing with ancient Rome and contemporary 
ritain.B
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9  Young, Weeks, and Hewitt thereby established a tradition in the mid-1870s which 
ould last for decades, of speaking and writing as if Britain's experience was directly 
levant to the United States, and indeed as if it was almost the only experience relevant to 
e United States as it confronted its own labor problem.  
The end of this period of serious interest, sometimes bordering on admiring 
scination, can be dated with only slightly less precision than its start. Before World War I, 
ddle-class Americans do not seem to have been very sure about the 
stem of industrial relations, but by the early 1920s they were ready e
to stop caring.  A few labor activists and progressive intellectuals remained 
thusiastic for the British model of industrial relations, and it even gained support from a 
fferent quarter and for different reasons in the 1930s; but these views had little resonance 
d, crucially, no longer any policy significance.10 
* * * 
e depression of the 1870s and the aftermath of World War I thus bracket a distinctive 
riod when American discourse about labor moved beyond old assumptions that the United 
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1. The Day of the Saxon12: Reformers and the Labor Problem  
In 1913 the labor economist and historian Henry Hoagland, in an article subtitled ‘A Study in 
Am ence 
of his emerging field on British inspiration, its lack of confidence in American institutions: 
tha
in f
Hoagland's
independen
commonpla unionism was simply British trades unionism, 
writ late an
acts -- namely, that American laborers have looked to the English 
unions for leadership -- is hardly justified.  Instead, American unions...have followed 
thei
tes was like other industrializing societies and could learn from them toward a view 
pidly consolidated by the early twenties, that there was a distinctive American Way to 
hich the experiences of other nations could contribute nothing useful. As my title suggests, 
mericans began by anticipating the convergence theories of the 1960s to conclude that 
here industrial Britain had led, America should follow, down a common path determined by 
e irresistible forces of industrialism.  But Americans arrived in the 1920s with 
ceptionalism fully installed as ideology and practice.  Charting and explaining changing 
ptions of the British model through this half-century, and their impact, is the rest of this 
icle’s purpose.11 
erican Trade Unionism’ (emphasis added), complained about the intellectual depend
The undergraduate student of economics who knows anything at all of the history of 
modern labor organizations generally receives his knowledge from reading the epoch-
making work by Sydney (sic) and Beatrice Webb....[T]he student is led to conclude 
t modern trade unions were first developed in England and were later transplanted 
ull bloom to American soil. 
 purpose was to explain that the American labor movement had its own 
t history, with roots decades old.  But first he felt he had to fend off the 
ce assumption that American trades 
d small: 
Of course it is true that the labor organizations of this country have not always kept 
pace with those of England.... It is also true that at times the English unions have been 
a decade or more in advance of the American.  But the conclusion which is so often 
drawn from these f
r own line of development.13 
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The British share of the labor force and the migration stream fell, and the AFL 
tablished itself under a leadership increasingly convinced that American conditions 
quired a uniquely American response.
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Yearley has argued quite convincingly that British influence on American unions declined by 
the 1890s. 
es
re
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agland's conclusions are unexceptionable nowadays, but at the time his exceptionalism 
as still quite unusual, even among his colleagues.  American respect for the British model 
labor relations can be explained in two ways -- institutional and intellectual.  Americans, 
rticularly those of British origin, looked to British experience as both the best-developed 
d the most comparable example for them to study and appropriate, the achievement of a 
ciety and culture with which they were closely connected.  There was a natural kinship; as 
 president, Henry Towne, told the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in 1889, 
her we constitute the two branches of the great Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking race, 
hich, in accomplishment, especially in the industrial world, is at present easily the leader 
ong the nations in the march of civilization.’14 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the novice was overtaking the old hand in the 
ce for economic growth. British observers became increasingly 
dustrial power and the growing productivity advantage it depended upon.  In the 
wardian period the United States enjoyed a clear lead, and British commentators began to 
rry about their relative decline. But the differences between Britain and the United States 
 industrializing nations still did not seem large enough to persuade Americans that Britain's 
perience was irrelevant. Through the Progressive Era, Britain's was not generally perceived 
 a failed industrial economy; even if its economic performance compared increasingly 
orly with America's; it was still worthy of study and selective emulation.15 
Britain was singularly important as a model for American labor, particularly in the 
rly decades of craft unionism.  American labor activists did not have to read about the 
ritish labor movement in order to learn from it; many had direct, personal experience.16  
17  But this did not weaken the enthusiasm of sections 
 the concerned American middle class, including thoughtful employers, for the British 
odel as they understood it, which acquired a life of its own.  Joseph Weeks, Abram Hewitt, 
d others continued sermonizing about their perception of mid-Victorian Britain's 
s in the management of industrial conflict through and after American labor’s 
reat Upheaval of the mid-1880s, and found a receptive audience, if not among their 
ployees, then at least among their bourgeois brethren.18 
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w
n the Pullman Strike sharpened anxieties about the labor problem, middle-class 
 interest in the British experience grew.  Mundella-style arbitration in the 1860s 
d 1870s used impartial intervention from local elites (who acted as 'umpires' -- the name 
r the referee in some sports acquiring popularity and formal organization at the same time 
 British employers and workers were also learning the ‘rules of the game’) to assist the 
rties to resolve their disputes, or even to reach decisions where they could not agree among 
emselves.  But by the 1890s that model was often replaced by direct discussions between 
ciated employers and union leaders.  The Webbs called this ‘collective bargaining.’ 
mpires might still have a role in the resulting relationships, but mutual recognition by and 
ect contact between the parties was key.  Carroll Wright, Joseph Weeks, economist Henry 
arter Adams, and in due course Marcus Hanna, amongst others, tried to lead informed 
inion in the 1890s toward an understanding of what was required for this voluntarist road 
 social peace to work in America too: in Weeks's words, ‘you cannot have arbitration and 
nciliation unless you have on each side a strong union.’ 19 
This was the new lesson reformers took from the British experience and attempted to 
ply to America. As Commons commented, in his report on the Nationa
s higher form of industrial peace – negotiation -- has now reached a formal stage 
in a half dozen large industries in the United States, which, owing to its remarkable 
likeness to parliamentary government in t
called constitutional government in industry....This remarkable form of 
titutional government is not the creation of any single intellect, nor of any 
stitutional convention.  It did not spring self-created from the theories of 
nomists or publicists.  It 'just growed,' like Topsy and the British Constitution.  
eed, it has not yet finished growing.20 
 experiments had the added legitimacy of appearing native, authentic, spontaneous, 
blic-spirited, and practical.  In addition, their resemblence to successful British 
uggested they would solve the labor problem by steering trade unions under 
, responsible leadership firmly down the reassuri
21
The attention middle-class and reformist Americans paid to the British experience 
as of a piece with established patterns of thought about the nature and evolution of their 
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Pioneer advocates Weeks and Hewitt; federal agencies (the Chicago Strike Commission of 
ciety. Impressed by the forces of industrialism and what we would call 'modernization,' 
ucated Americans believed that these were forcing a fundamental convergence in different 
cieties.  As Joseph Weeks put it in 1895, ‘The primary problems of civilization are material 
es; their answers are writ in fire.’22  Industrialization was a process dominated, at the time, 
 the three nations thought to share a common 'Teutonic' heritage in the racial Anglo-
xonism of the mid- to late nineteenth century.  Transformations in the meaning of Ango-
xonism, away from romantic racialism and toward an interpretation emphasizing a shared 
ory, language, and political tradition, further accentuated Americans tendency to 
inimize or ignore the institutional and cultural barriers to policy borrowing from Great 
itain that an exceptionalist analysis would emphasize.23   
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also marked the
mericans' respectful familiarity with this Anglo-American common culture.  
anks to the influence of American Historical Association policy on the high-school 
rriculum after 1889, more Americans studied British history in depth as the foundation for 
ir own history in the early twentieth century than ever before or since.24  And that shared 
st shaped how Americans understood the British model of labor relations, and its American 
unterparts.  Commons could write about the Interstate Conference between bituminous coal 
erators and miners as being like a medieval parliament of Lords and (sic) Commons, 
htly assuming that most of his readers could understand, indeed visualize, his simile.  
enty years later his student William Leiserson required an even better knowledge of a 
rsion of the common past – though not his past -- when he explained that the steel 
panies' employment of unskilled workers to break skilled workers' strikes was ‘but 
petition of the Tudor Kings of England using the common people against the nobles to re-
tablish absolute monarchy.’  One of the attractive features of this Whiggish version of 
story to American labor reformers like Commons or Leiserson was its doctrine of inevitable 
ogress toward democracy. When Commons spoke about the 'constitutionalizing' of industry 
rough the wider application of the trade agreement idea, his readers would have understood 
at he did not anticipate an American-model written constitution, but something more like 
ritain's informal constitutional order, an accumulation of precedents – a common law of 
r.25 
* * * 
iddle-class Americans' understanding of the British model became fixed by the early 1900s.  
 rican labor problem, even after the failure of NCF-style voluntarism in 1901-2 and 
e launching of the Open Shop movement in 1903. Unions were stagnant at best, employers 
 the offensive, conflict worsening.  Convergence was evidently not happening; instead, the 
xceptional’ American system was taking shape . Committed to trade unionism and 
llective bargaining to bring a measure of ‘democracy in industry,’ American progressives 
ced hostile American employers and judges. They still looked to the British example, at 
t as they understood it, for inspiration.  The prewar British reality of growing industrial 
rest would not have been as useful, so it was ignored. 
8
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pe d union growth and increasing militancy.  Instead, the lessons of the mid- to late-
Victorian compromise among unions, employers, and the state were still held to be relevant 
to the Ame
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94, the Bureau of Labor, the Industrial Commission, and the Anthracite Coal Strike 
mmission of 1902-3); the experts who had influenced them, and whose careers they 
rtured (Carroll Wright, Walter Weyl, Jeremiah Jenks, Dana Durand, and Commons 
mself); and the NCF, which Wright, Durand, and Commons used to disseminate their 
essage -- had relayed much the same story, a faithful rendering of the satisfied consensus of 
spectable opinion in Britain.26  The basic elements remained plausible.  British trade unions 
ere still larger, better established, and more stable than their American counterparts; British 
ployers appeared more reconciled to union recognition than their American peers; British 
llective bargaining systems looked durable and effective, and had the prestige belonging to 
ganic social invention in the era of ‘evolutionary naturalism.’  A viable alternative to 
mpulsory arbitration (an alternative panacea), British voluntarism was consistent with both 
untries' anti-statist traditions.  Britain’s comparatively peaceful strikes also contrasted ever 
ore favorably with America's during the Age of Industrial Violence.27  And, finally, the 
ost pressing questions of the 1900s and early 1910s for friends of labor -- How should labor 
a political voice?  How could it defend itself against threats from the judiciary? – had 
en answered already in Great Britain, and in ways progressive Americans found 
rsuasive. Independent (non-socialist) labor representation in national politics, in alliance 
ith the New Liberalism, and capable of freeing trade unions from judicial challenges to 
luntarism, offered an object lesson to AFL progressives and their Wisconsin School 
lies.28 
Americans learned little else new about British labor relations after 1900 despite the 
riod’s rapi
This filtering process was unsettling for contemporaries who confronted a reality 
ntradicting their models.  When the young progressive intellectual Randolph Bourne co
Comment [H.J.1]:   As 
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2. We Have Seen the Future, and It Sucks:  
American Employers and the British Model 
A  problem in histories of ideas 
about s  matter are those of policy-
or  business community had their 
ow
un
be
co
exam gineers, an organization inspired 
by  some of Weeks's field-work for 
him in 187
elled to Britain in 1913, he did not find the industrial millennium his predecessors had 
ported, a peaceable kingdom where capitalist lions lay down happily beside labor lambs. 
stead, ‘England is one succession of fearful strikes, and our fond theory of the triumph of 
derly trade-unionism … is daily knocked into a cocked hat.’29 
t before Bourne and his older, less radical friends had time to adjust to this new and 
convenient industrial Britain, the First World War struck.  The war ushered in a final 
escendo of American progressive interest in British social experimentation along with great 
that, if it would only learn from the British example, American society would be 
nsformed in the direction of industrial democracy by the rising power of organized labor.30   
Obviously that did not occur.  Instead, there was America's second, and apparently 
oment of exceptionalism.  Instead of an advance into Reconstruction (a term 
rrying none of the negative freight in Britain that it did in the United States), there was a 
treat into Normalcy; instead of a Labour Party and industrial democracy, Republican 
gemony and the American Plan.  The rest of this article will explain why and how the 
experience contributed to this conservative outcome almost as much as a liberal 
ading of Britain’s labor relations model had inspired progressive hopes for something 
mpletely different. 
 weakness of the previous section of this article -- a common
ocial policy -- is the implicit assumption that the ideas that
iented, reformist intellectuals.  But members of the American
n sources of information about Britain, their own ideas about it and saw it as a model of an 
desired future. And what they thought about the British model, and how it affected their 
haviour, turned out to be far more important.   
The British and American employer communities had dense networks of 
mmunication, paralleling those of the transatlantic world of reform. Hewitt and Weeks, for 
ple, presided over the American Institute of Mining En
 the (British) Iron and Steel Institute, whose secretary did
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ro  arbitration: ‘a new power has 
entered into the industrial world which must be recognized.  … [T]his power can not be 
destroyed b
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af
intervals, in strikes and lock-outs, which have no redeeming feature...  [T]he interests 
of a
mbership; business news and reports about new technologies traveled rapidly both ways 
ross the Atlantic. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers could be more insular, 
t the trade journal that was its midwife, the American Machinist, circulated widely 
erseas – so much so that it established a separate British edition – informing its far-flung 
adership of developments in labor as well as in manufacturing and managerial methods. 
merican managers and entrepreneurs had an interest in British realities, to keep abreast of 
eir most important competitors and even to acquire British manufacturing subsidiaries. 
nghouse, for example, built a factory at Trafford Park, Manchester, and gained direct 
perience of the travails of working with a British labor force in a unionized environment.31 
This meant that, at critical moments of labor relations crisis American businessmen 
 across the Atlantic and draw distinctly different lessons than did social reformers. 
t Kim Voss's moment when exceptionalism began -- the Great Upheaval of the mid-1880s 
Weeks's boss at The Iron Age, James Bayles, was distinctly less upbeat about the British 
odel than Weeks himself.  Bayles noted the tendency of 'responsible' British labor 
ership -- an essential ingredient in making union recognition and collective bargaining 
latable to employers -- to collapse in the face of the rank-and-file militancy.  Democratic 
ocesses prevented these organizations from remaining remain disciplined bargaining 
rtners. Bayles concluded that it would be better to consult with employees, but only with 
e's own employees, in house. Anticipating the preferences of a subsequent generation of 
merican employers, he recommended the ‘shop council’ as a unilateral alternative to 
tside labor organization, and representation32 
Even Abram Hewitt was of two minds about the wisdom or necessity of the British 
ad. On the one hand, union recognition, conciliation, and
y force and violence unless society be destroyed with it.  It must be heard.  Its just 
mands must be heeded.  This is the voice of reason as well as of religion.’33  On the other, 
ter the Molly Maguires, the Hewitt also preached a gospel of pre-emption, not concession:  
To insure continuous operations, the best relations must exist between the corporate 
owners and the laborers in their employ… [But] throughout the coal regions these 
relations have been of the most unsatisfactory character, resulting, at often-recurring 
ll classes concur in the prevention of these destructive and demoralizing 
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clearly fav
th
 him in any organization, 
and when a man declines to combine it is a violation of right to refuse to work with 
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collisions, and … the owners of the property, for their own self-protection, will be 
driven to remove the causes which have produced them.34 
ears before Bayles, Hewitt thus anticipated another of the foundation ideas of American 
siness's exceptionalism: industrial paternalism, or welfare capitalism, the unilateral 
provement o
Hewitt fleshed out these contradictory messages over the next fourteen years.  Unions 
ere as much a product of capitalist development as were corporations themselves: ‘The 
rmation of such unions is alike a right and a duty; and so long as they confine themselves to 
 assertion of the rights and the protection of the interests of their members they are to be 
mmended and encouraged.’35  But this rhetorical acceptance of trade unionism was, as 
ways with American employers, wrapped around with qualifications that diminished it, in 
actice, to almost nothing.  The solution to the labor problem ‘must be based upon justice’; 
d justice must be built on a set of classic republican contractual principles, which left little 
om for actually-existing trade unionism.  Employers and workmen both had the right to 
mbine, but neither had the right to coerce the other; free-labor principles meant that ‘the 
of workmen to refrain from labor and the right of the employer to cease to employ are 
rrelative rights; but no one has the right to compel any other workman to cease from labor, 
r has the employer any right to lock out his workmen in order to compel submission to 
noxious rules.’36 
While maintain
ored capital, because it alone assumed the risks of doing business, and because 
ere were some offences that only labor could commit: 
No man has the right to compel another man to combine with
, and to deny him the means of earning a living.  It is equally wrong for employers 
lack-list men, so that others will not give them employment. 
oycott cannot be defended under any circumstances whatever.  It is in effect a 
laration of private war...to be stamped out by prompt and severe punishmen
m of any body of men that under any circumstances they have the right to stop the 
s of business...cannot be tolerated.37 
 d productivity, only to be tolerated if hedged around with laws, and to be undermined by 
ployers' conduct within their own establishments.  Employers should hold fast to the 
iple that ‘Each man should be paid wages according to the value of his labor, and not on 
e mistaken basis of a dead level of mediocrity, advocated and enforced by some trades-
ganization.  Progress is only possible where the individual is encouraged to develop his 
ill and apply his labor, by a payment in proportion to the results achieved.’  Beyond this, 
ey should develop novel systems of reward -- profit sharing, and, best of all, employee 
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at should be plain enough: unions were acceptable in principle, provided they did not 
tually do those things on which their power depended.  Hewitt's vision was of a future with 
de unions -- but without strikes or collectively-imposed limitations on the freedom of 
ployers or employees.  Hewitt's limited commitment to arbitration and conciliation was a 
nction of his hatred of industrial conflict, for which civilized substitutes must be found; 
ce the latter ‘competent tribunals’ were in place, strikes and lock-outs would be 
defensible.’  Conciliation and arbitration were simply ‘transitional means for bringing 
the ate relations of peace and harmony which must exist between capital and 
bor.’38  Evidently, Hewitt imported the British model very selectively, choosing only those 
ements that addressed his immediate concern -- conflict-reduction -- while overlooking 
erything else, notably the general acceptance by parliament, and to a lesser extent the 
employers, of everyday trades union practices that he found intolerable. 
Indeed, Hewitt shared many negative stereotypes about British labor relations 
coming commonplace among his peers.  Already in 1867, alongside plaudits to British 
r, he complained about ‘strikes long continued and in all branches of business, reducing 
e workmen to beggary and destroying the profits of capital to such an extent that in a spirit 
self-preservation it takes flight where it can from the walks of industry and remains 
employed rather than incur the risks and the anxieties of its uses in active business.’39  A 
neration later, he still accused British labor of undermining economic progress: 
action of the trade-unions has been exerted in the direction of obliterating the 
ividual to such an extent that special skill is rapidly declining, and in the finer 
es of work it is almost impossible to find the experience required for the 
duction of instruments of precision.  This is a national evil of the first magnitude; 
 its disastrous consequences are becoming apparent to the intelligent workman 
ose opportunities to rise in life are thus abridged and destroyed.40 
ewitt, trade unions were at best a necessary evil; enemies of individualism, order
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pheaval in the mid-1880s, and many of the tactics they would use for decades in their anti-
bor struggles were developed.  But the game was only just beginning.  The crucial time of 
cision for employers came later, during the short-lived Trade Agreement Era, as Jeffrey 
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* * * 
Kim Voss's moment when American labor relations becam ptional is far too early.  
Agreed, employers' anti-union predispositions were sharpened and clarified in that first Great 
U
la
de
k-ownership, ‘the stimulus of being engaged in a successful business and having a direct 
terest in its results.’ The industrial millennium would not come from collective bargaining 
conciliation and arbitration, but ‘w
 every well-managed corporation will see that its workmen are directly interested 
the results of the business.’41 
Two years before Homestead, four before Pullman, a dozen before the failure of the 
CF and the Anthracite Coal Strike award, Hewitt had laid down the impossibly narrow 
undaries within which trades unions could be tolerated, and made clear his preference for a 
itary-corporatist syste
ether.   
he concentration of force under one management, in accordance with the modern 
dency to centralization, may be made to solve, and must necessarily solve, the 
blem of harmonizing capital and labor engaged in the work of production, without 
 legislation or the application of any other than familiar and well-recognized 
ciples of social organization....[T]he invasion of government into the domain of 
ustry must be met with uncompromising opposition.42 
s it would be, except where the exercise of the federal government's coercive power, 
gitimized by judicial innovation, aimed at repressing labor unions and strikes.43   
as been useful to clarify what the leading, exceptionally articulate employer 
vocate of labor-management harmony, British-style, actually meant. Not surprisingly, 
was far more American than British in his outlook; for him, selective borrowing of 
titutions was secondary to the pursuit of industrial relations strategies whose 
rpose was altogether different.  Union recognition, conciliation, and arbitration were 
eans, not ends; they were to contain industrial conflict until the occasions for it were 
iminated.  Discarding Hewitt’s equivocation, later American employers would implement 
ly the latter part of his program. 
e exce
 f how much trouble and strife it would cost employers to win back a necessary 
inimum of workplace authority if they allowed unions to grow too strong in the first place? 
e rapid breakdown of the Murray Hill Agreement in 1901 backed the doubters’ arguments. 
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 British Engineers' experience?  
Instead of demonstrating the promise of the trade agreement system, was it not instead dire 
evidence o
m
Th
ydu and David Brian Robertson, among others, have argued.  Between 1898 and 1903 
dustrialists were faced with a serious challenge from dynamic AFL craft unions.  
espectable and official opinion, represented in the NCF and through successive federal 
mmissions of the 1890s and early 1900s, still advocated the British model of conciliation 
d collective bargaining. Many American employers were, in the late Howard Gitelman's 
wo minds’ confronting labor’s challenge. Their own reading of the British 
 with union power and labor conflict would help to resolve their choice.44 
The primary and secondary metal-processing and metal-working industries were the 
orm-center during the Trade Agreement Era.  Iron and steel offered the first evidence that 
hile Hewitt's younger executive successors had little of his ambivalence toward labor 
ganization, they had all of his suspicion, and sufficient power to act on their hostility. But 
e biggest failures of the NCF were in the secondary metal-working industries, the foundry 
d machine trades, whose craft union leaders and proprietary capitalists played such a large 
rt in the NCF itself, and whose experiments in union recognition and the creation of 
tional and loc
omising. 
ployers in these skill-dependent industries knew about, and were impressed by, 
cent British experience. After a huge national lock-out in 1897-98, British engineering 
ployers had forced 'Terms of Settlement' on the Amalgamated Society of Engineers.  To 
me, this victory demonstrated that associated employers could impose a tolerable deal on 
en the strongest craft union, and then use that union to discipline its members into 
epting harsh terms as a condition of continuing recognition. Widely discussed among the 
embers of the National Founders' and National Metal Trades Associations (NMTA), this 
ample was a model for their own struggles with the Iron Molders' Union and the 
ternational Association of Machinists in 1899-1904.  The latter's Murray Hill Agreement 
ith the NMTA in 1900 embodied ‘most of the terms, and even some of the phraseology, of 
e “Conditions of Management” agreed upon between the Federated Engineering Employers 
Great Britain and the Allied Trade Unions.’ 45 
But was this the key message to be derived from the
 15
Americans understood it, but for American employers, the criticism drowned out 
alifications.  Publisher John Murray, who reissued the articles as a book, argued that he 
ld[ed] to no one in appreciation of the great work accomplished by trade unions, 
t...their policy of restriction of output and of individual effort is doing more injury to the 
dustrial trade of this country than foreign tariffs.’  The articles’ author, Edwin Pratt, could 
plain that ‘the point … was … not to attack trade unionism “as an institution,” but to deal, 
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e 1901 Machinists' strike was ‘a sharp disappointment to the advocates of association and 
nference as a means of averting labor troubles’; ‘a forecast of the more paralyzing 
croachments of that unwise trade-unionism which has been Britain's bane.’  Browne & 
arpe's superintendent emphasized that ‘we all agree here at present that the exact issue at 
ake is to unionize all the shops in the United States.  That is only a prelude to the unions' 
dertaking later on the management of the machine business.  The effect of that can easily 
 seen by studying the situation in Great Britain.’  Thus the message of the British 
eering trades’ unhappy experience was not that an acceptable settlement could be 
ached after a long and bitter strike, but that even after a supreme effort employers still faced 
 intolerable union presence in their shops. As Robert Wuest, the NMTA's aggressive 
mmissioner, told his members in 1904, the real lesson of the British experience was to 
ild up a strong enough organization to prevent the need to recognize organized labor in the 
st place.  ‘Let them take warning by studying the result of Great Britain's former apathy 
d indifference to questions pertaining to labor, and let us avoid the death-dealing blow by 
that old maxim, “A Stitch in Time,” and let us not wait, as did our Engli
ross the water to “lock the stable door,” after the trade is gone.’46 
 early 1900s was perhaps the worst time for the NCF and its associates to use the 
ritish case to support their project, because American employers'  by then  well-established 
gative stereotypes about British industry and its labor relations were being reinforced by 
ws from Britain itself.  These were the years of the (supposed) American ‘export invasion’ 
the British home market, and (feared) capture of Britain's export markets.  There was 
xious discussion of the reasons for this comparative failure; and many explanations pointed 
ward what The Times labelled, in a series of articles in the Fall of 1901, ‘The Crisis in 
ritish Industry.’  The central theme of the Times articles was that trade unions were 
gressive, restrictive, and pursuing outmoded, destructive policies, if not through formal 
rgaining then very effectively through rank-and-file action.47 
This message was mixed up with continuing advocacy of the British m
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her, with the abuses that had crept into an organisation which, in the opinion of many 
ployers, should occupy a legitimate and even useful place in the scheme of industrial 
ogress, so long as it is directed along reasonable lines.’  But the part of the message that 
erican employers was the one they were already inclined to hear.48 
At the very same NCF conference in December 1901 that offered up a vision of 
aceful collective bargaining in the Anglo-American future, employer member Charles 
hwab, President of U.S. Steel, countered with grim skepticism.  He was, he said, 
ipally interested in the labor problem from the angle of its effect on U.S. prosperity.  
e decline of Great Britain could best be explained by the attitude of labor to capital.  ‘I am 
rry to say that every labor organization with which I have had experience in the past has 
d as its foundation the restriction of output.  It is that principle which is putting English 
mmerce and English trade in the bad position in which they are today.’  Like Hewitt 
rlier, he did not pronounce against labor unions per se, but he was certainly opposed to 
ose actually existing: output-restricting, contract-breaking, etc.  And this was enough of a 
ndation on which to build a rigorously anti-labor policy.49 
bor relations system?  While Britain’s unions were crippling the old country, ‘[t]he 
ture,’ as H.G. Wells would put it in 1906, was ‘in America’.  In their flight from 
competitiveness, it was to America that British employers and managers must look for ‘the 
spel of good tidings industrially’.50  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
ffic of industrial investigators across the Atlantic ran both ways, with a growing counter-
w of self-critical British observers who wandered through America and liked what they 
w.  Weeks's collaborator Stephen Jeans, summing up the results of a British investigation of 
e iron, steel, and related industries which he organized, reached a conclusion with which 
w American businessmen would disagree: 
The trade union is not generally recognized as a militant force in the United States 
except now and again.  Few employers are read
uence worth naming.  The almost absolute freedom of labour has been been the 
f instrument whereby it has won such conquests in the field of industrial economy 
ing the last quarter of a century.51 
sues presented in this fashion, who among American employers would be inclined 
 the siren voices tempting them to steer their storm-tossed Yankee clipper toward 
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itish rocks?  Leaving nothing to chance, Schwab funded a research effort to explore the 
nnection between trade unionism and restriction of output.  American scholars focus on the 
merican section written by Commons and Walter Weyl. But this is followed by a neglected 
0 page report on Britain, the home of ‘ca' canny,’ by their collaborator John Gray.  For 
ployers, this was dismal reading.  The engineering employers' splendid settlement?  
T]here is scarcely a single clause...which is not couched in language sufficiently vague to 
ve rise to controversy over its interpretation.’ The wonderful record of industrial peace?  
]he boards of arbitration and conciliation truly give peace by producing sleep.’  The 
ritish model was slow, indecisive, and obstructed change:  
 the present state of disputes between the employer and employee, it may justly be 
 that the employer has ceased to have any hope of improving the organization, 
cesses, or machinery of his industry.  It is because of this attitude...that English 
ustry has reached such a degree of stagnation.  Wherever the workmen are well 
anized they insist that the phrase 'new and untried conditions of work' includes any 
trivial.  Nothing but a complete adherence to existing organization, 
chinery, material, and methods will satisfy a strong union that employers are 
ering to this clause.  The possibility of all experiments is excluded.52 
* * * 
ection be
rategic decisions for the Open Shop rather than the Trade Agreement, on the one hand, and 
e advice and information they were receiving about British industrial realities, on the other.  
ucturalist political sociologists’ and historians’ arguments in terms of power and interest, 
story and market context, are obviously the more persuasive. The outcome of American 
dustrialists' debates and uncertainties in the early 1900s was probably overdetermined. But 
ceptionalism was built in a transatlantic context; American employers, too, studied British 
perience, not to replicate but to avoid it.53  Like their lib-lab contemporaries, their interest 
 it probably declined after the early 1900s: in the case of both groups, their minds were 
ready made up, and they did not need new information to confuse the stereotypical views 
ich supported their established positions. 
 18
3. 1917
As
inte
ex
of
pe
su
A
ga
en
is
al
in
m ol, man- and woman-power 
mobilization, and i 55
own
de
ca
D
ta
ev
pr
econom
to hold the balance between contending labor and capital and to earn the good will of 
bot
hav
leg
wh
rep
The delega l progressives and the AFL, whose 
leader, Samuel Gompers, was in effect its host.  The war economy must be built on a 
-1918: EXCEPTIONALISM CHALLENGED  
 Daniel Rodgers has recently reminded us, the First World War saw an explosion of 
rest and enthusiasm from progressive American labor-liberals in Britain's war-induced 
periments in collectivist control of the economy and democratization of industry.  War 
fered them the possibility of rapid social and institutional change that normal gridlocked 
acetime politics could not deliver. Britain's experiments (and, even more, the rhetoric 
rrounding them) offered hopeful direction for that change, and the strengthening of Anglo-
merican strategic collaboration (‘Anglophilism became an integral part of American life’54) 
ve Britain's wartime corporatists a splendid opportunity to do something the British always 
joy, instructing backward folk in lesser nations about how much better the United Kingdom 
 at doing things. The picture they relayed to enthusiastic American audiences was of an 
most perfectly functioning, smoothly-running governmental machine, integrating organized 
terests into policy-making and administration, proceeding by consent and yet delivering a 
iracle of munitions production, industrial peace, wage contr
mproved working conditions.  
The British message was convenient for Wilsonian liberals, as well as attractive in its 
 right: it told them what they wanted to hear.  Soon after the United States declared war, a 
legation of British trade union leaders, Labour MPs, and Ministry of Munitions experts 
me to the United States, invited by the Committee on Labor of the Council of National 
efense.  According to them, ‘Labor in our country has, from the beginning of the war, been 
ken into the confidence of the Government, the Government seeking its cooperation on 
ery conceivable occasion, and that has been one of the greatest factors in making matters 
oceed smoothly.’  The Ministry of Munitions, a huge organization at the heart of the war 
y, saw its role as being  
h sides....[A]ny good work by which we have arranged that good will could only 
e been done by that hearty cooperation which labor leaders have given to us....No 
islative enactment dealing with labor has gone before the House of Commons 
ich has not first been in conference between the minister of munitions and the 
resentatives of organized labor.56   
tion's message was music to the ears of socia
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 basis, where leaders of the 'responsible' labor movement were included 
 the councils of state at the highest level, on par with representatives of capital.  Policy must 
velop and be implemented through interest-group bargaining.  And, crucially, the 
cessities of mobilization must not be exploited by reactionary employers to roll back hard-
on social protections.  ‘[O]ne of the mistakes that we made in the war was to forget the 
man side.  If you are going to have a long war nothing is more fatal than to start to exhaust 
ur men and women at this stage.’  The British Health of Munitions Workers Committee 
d assembled the best and most authoritative scientific evidence in support of the 
oductivity as well as welfare benefits of shorter hours and other improvements in working 
nditions. American labor and its social progressive allies must now build on that 
perience so that the war led to no backward step.  It was unanimously resolved ‘That this 
mmittee approve a like policy in
s of labor and securing the highest efficiency and economy in the production of 
nd supplies.’57 
Angry at the hijacking of the meeting to make propaganda for collective bargaining 
d the eight-hour day, employer delegates could do little but complain. As Charles Stillman, 
esident of the American Federation of Teachers, emphasized, ‘[W]e have grown 
customed to looking at England as a Mecca,’ and this was never truer than in 1917-1918. 
r, if the British present was bright, the future glowed brighter yet.  And the industrial 
illennium was heading westward across the Atlantic.  As
are out to win this war, but we have also got a much wider task than that....[W]e 
e also, after that, to in some sense reorganize the world.  We can only do that...on 
 lines on which...we have already started.  We must get labor and government and 
ital together.  We must get them working together and get them at conferences, 
 we must create between them a spirit of confidence by which they may work 
ether loyally and without faltering in order to overcome the ravages of war.58 
us war made the British model seem more relevant than ever for social progressives and 
r’s friends.  It was useful for American mobilization agencies to be able to draw upon an 
ly's experience, avoiding mistakes and imitating success; it was inspiring to have an ally 
ho demonstrated that a democracy could also be efficient.  And it was uplifting to believe 
at the sacrifice of war would not be in vain, because the British idea of ‘reconstruction’ -- 
ere was already even a Ministry of that name -- promised a better world after the war.59 
 20
gr
in
an
an
co
or
sy
re
19 er over cracks in the collapsing truce between labor, 
employers
im
of 
was si
lib
de
pr
th
Wh
si
for
de
re
se
de
ga
C
lab
favori
ha
be
The Whitley Committee, a subcommittee of the Ministry of Reconstruction, had 
eatest influence on the discourse of U.S. industrial relations. The Committee was tripartite 
 structure and corporatist in approach, as were its recommendations for the establishment of 
 integrated system of factory, regional, and industrial councils bringing together workers 
d their employers.  In already-organized industries, these councils would build on existing 
llective bargaining structures; elsewhere, there would be government sponsorship, 
ganizing employer and union interests until they could manage on their own. Above this 
stem would stand a National Industrial Council; this would also be the principal 
commendation of the United States National Industrial Conference called in the spring 
19 in a desperate effort to pap
, and the state. 
The Whitley scheme is less important for its details -- few of which were ever 
plemented -- than for its impact on the parallel American debate about the vexed question 
how to put some practical meaning into the notion of ‘industrial democracy.’  One option 
mply to import bits of the British program.  In July 1919, for example, managerial 
eral Henry Dennison handed out copies of the Whitley Report to his employees' 
partmental representatives to give them ideas and models to follow. 60  But such clear, 
ecise, and direct borrowing was rare. Instead, many of Dennison’s fellow employers saw 
e British example as more relevant than ever before, but still as a threat, not a promise. 
en other American employers reacted both to the Whitley scheme and to 
multaneous pressures, mediated through the National War Labor Board (NWLB), for some 
m of representation in industry, they rejected the British example except as a point of 
parture or of negative reference.  They had already constructed their own exceptional labor 
lations system after 1903 during the first phase of the Open Shop Era; their challenge in this 
cond, critical phase was to resist any pressures for British-style corporatism and industrial 
mocracy.  The evolution of the thinking of Julius Cohen, attorney for the New York 
rment trade employers through the Era of the Protocol, is instructive.  Before the war, 
ohen had proposed the simple, direct importation of British corporatist schemes to solve 
or problems .  But by 1919, chastened by experience, Cohen struck a more patriotic note,  
ng ‘not a British Plan, or a French Plan, or a Russian Plan, but an American Plan, in 
rmony with our institutions, our laws, our customs and our outlook generally.’61 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr, himself, explained what that might mean.  In his address 
fore the War and Reconstruction Conference of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1918, 
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guing with one another in print back home about what they observed, and battling to 
luence a business community that they all claimed to represent, with varying degrees of 
ausibility.  The most important was sent by the National Industrial Conference Board 
ICB), a new organization set up in 1916 to coordinate the work of anti-union employers’ 
ciations, to undertake research, propaganda, and strategic thinking on their behalf, and to 
present them to the public and government.  The crisis of wartime labor relations had made 
ese tasks urgent; the NICB’s status had also been boosted by its role as the nominating 
dy for the employers’ delegation on the War Labor Conference Board and NWLB, and 
en providing them with support.  In September 1917, the NICB became alarmed at the 
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4. 1919: FROM THE BRITISH MODEL TO THE AMERICAN WAY 
In 19
ar
inf
pl
(N
asso
re
th
bo
th
gave respectful attention to Britain's proposals but endorsed something ‘less 
mprehensive, and which is constructed from the bottom up’: plant-based, company-
itiated employee representation, of the kind the Ro
war, and that the NWLB had endorsed as a compromise between labor's demands 
tion and employers' resistance. 
re, then, would seem to be a method of providing representation which is just, 
ich is effective, which is applicable to all employes (sic) whether organized or 
ganized, to all employers whether in associations or not, which does not compete 
nterfere with existing organizations or associations, and which, while developed in 
ngle industrial corporation as a unit, may be expanded to i c
in the same industry and ultimately all industries.62 
ockefeller's proposal was 'American' because it built on what already existed, it relied on 
ivate, local initiative, and there was no explicit place in it for either the state or organized 
bor.  Thus Rockefeller set an agenda for his class, both in policy and in presen
ic which required at least the promise of democratic reform.  
ckefeller had pointed a way that other businessmen followed only after undertaking 
eir own intensive examination of the contemporary realities of British industrial relations 
at rejected the image peddled by British visitors and their American labor-liberal 
eerleaders.  The British model mattered more to American employers than ever before; 
derstanding it correctly might help them decide how to meet labor’s postwar challenge.   
19, three delegations of American employers travelled around a strike-torn Britain, 
 le  the Department, not appointed by any of the business community’s representative 
dies.  None were from large firms or from the heavy metal trades; none had NWLB 
rvice.  They included a small manufacturer of adding machines and an advertising and 
blishing executive from Chicago, a Connecticut cotton-mill owner, a Massachusetts shoe 
anufacturer, a New York watch manufacturer, and a southern construction executive.  They 
 either from organized industries or at least from outside the Open Shop movement.  
ey were shepherded around Britain, and to the correct conclusions, by Royal Meeker, 
ommissioner of Labor Statistics, and B.M. Squires, chair of the board of arbitration of the 
ion-friendly U.S. Shipping Board.  Roger Babson, the Department’s chief publicist, 
plained their purpose and their message: 
22
im
to
10
al
em
B
tri
co
tra
br v lutionary mood sweeping all of America’s 
Eu opean 
 
ar
La
months
sh
th
th
ab
co
La
cha
 The Employers’ Industrial Commission was a propaganda ploy.  Its members were 
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pact of the message of those dangerous British Ministry of Munitions representatives 
uring the United States calling for the adoption of a British model of war corporatism and 
0 percent unionization.  How could they resist it?  It had all the apparent authority of an 
ly’s government behind it.  A fact-finding tour of the United Kingdom by American 
ployers, to develop counter-arguments, was suggested, but wartime priorities interfered. 
ut, the idea was not forgotten, and with victory in sight in October 1918, planning for the 
p began again – to focus now on problems of reconstruction or, to use the preferred 
nservative American term, readjustment, with its implications of restoration rather than 
nsformation.  Seven months passed before the resulting European Commission – its remit 
oadened because of the apparently re o
r allies – could depart.63 
While the NICB thought and prepared, others acted.  Two investigative commissions 
rived in Britain in February 1919, one from the NCF, the other from the U.S. Department of 
bor itself.  The NCF’s was the less important, despite the fact that its members spent four 
 in Europe, all but three weeks of them in Britain.  The NCF was by this time a 
adow of its former self, fanatically dedicated to a shrill anti-Communism and support for 
e AFL’s conservative leaders as bulwarks against radicalism.  The delegates were nobodies, 
eir comments rarely interesting though sometimes amusingly chauvinistic, their conclusions 
out British employers’ acceptance of trade unionism entirely predictable from a 
nservative corporatist body including AFL representatives.  In contrast, the Department of 
bor’s Employers’ Industrial Commission represented a far more significant and deliberate 
llenge to the emerging anti-labor consensus among American businessmen.64 
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like the Department of Labor’s, it was full of open-shop heavyweights, including 
illiam Van Dervoort (president and proprietor of a midwestern engineering firm) and 
yall Osborne (vice-president of Westinghouse), both fresh from fighting the employers' 
rner on the NWLB; Charles Asbury, vice-president of a mid-size, staunchly anti-union, 
ily-run foundry and machine shop, Enterprise Manufacturing of Philadelphia; and 
mberton Hutchinson, president of the Westmoreland Coal Co., also of Philadelphia, who 
ould be an employer delegate at the President's First Industrial Conference in October 1919 
plicitly because of the experience he had gained on the European Commission   Its staffer 
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 Determined to counter this dangerous message, the NICB’s commission finally set out 
in May. Un
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h industrial experiences have for many years been along the same paths as ours; 
t may be assumed from industrial history that the United States will follow 
ewhat later along similar paths as Great Britain.... British employers … are now 
 surprising degree united in the belief that disorganization of the employed spells 
order and all its attendant dangers.  This view is quite in line with the insistent 
messages of the United States Department of Labor that employers and employees 
should 'get together,' and that by 'collective bargaining' labor unrest is allayed.65 
ese conclusions were clear and convenient, and were backed by ‘facts’ and the signatures 
 the Department’s hand-picked business team. The friendly relations among government, 
ganized employers, and trade unions, and their shared enthusiasm for Whitleyism, was ‘a 
velation’ to these hapless provincials – had they been at all clued up before departure, they 
ould not have been remotely surprised -- and would ‘be a revelation to those at home, 
sclosing the p
66
ost all sweetness and light, with scarcely a shadow of doubt, their report was 
rprising after a two-month visit to a country where vital public services and major 
dustries were closed by mass strikes, and the commission’s labor interlocutors were frank 
out their radical plans.  As one member later reported, ‘They would tell us about the new 
der of society that they were going to bring about.  They were going to abolish private 
nership and all that sort of thing; profit was robbery, and so on.  We were considerably 
armed.’67  But Meeker, Squires, and Babson did their work so well that the report said what 
intended, offering Americans – particularly employers -- reassurance about the future, if 
ly they followed the British model. 
 eneral Motors, told the first national personnel conference that May, ‘To the manufacturers 
aking the world safe for democracy meant to keep what we had -- it meant to preserve the 
stem of private initiative; of voluntary association for business which has made this country 
eat.’ The way to do this was by being progressive, within limits, not reactionary; there was 
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 The NICB’s key recommendation was similar to that of Abram Hewitt and James 
Bayles ove
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in, professor emeritus of political economy at the University of 
 dedicated reactionary and a well-informed, effective polemicist.68 
The NICB’s aim was to add credibility to its arguments by thorough research, but it 
shed out an Interim Report in July to counter any immediate fallout from the Department of 
bor report.69  The Commission had the legitimacy that came with its representative status, 
d an advantage over the earlier visitors because of its excellent contacts with British 
ployer organizations.  Its resulting understanding of British realities was much more 
alistic, balanced, and complex than the Department of Labor’s airbrushed vision.  Its 
essage, too, was clear; just 180 degrees different:  ‘The forces which … have already 
ght British industries to such an impasse should not, by our careless passiveness, be 
rmitted to produce the same effects upon our own.’  Britain offered, not a model, but a 
ake-up call; an awful prospect of what might happen if American employers failed, like 
eir British brethren, to take the responsibilities of power seriously.  The employers the 
ICB met ‘strongly advised’ their American brethren to resist union growth; they admitted 
at too many of them had been ‘sluggish, thoughtless, unobserving, and selfish’ about taking 
ilateral action to improve conditions of labor; they were ‘largely responsible, by their lack 
prevision, for the existing state of discontent.’70 
r thirty years earlier:  
each employer should regard it as
tions with his workers.  It will not do to drift into a policy of neglect, as have some 
ish employers in the past, which has borne such bitter fruit in the dissatisfaction of 
present day.  The employer must see to it that no charge can be brought against 
 of not intelligently looking out for the interests of the rank and file in his 
blishment....The employer must take the lead; much in the way of leadership is 
ected of him.  He must generally plan to prevent grievances from arising.71   
rsonnel policies were the way to protect America’s union-free environment and 
et American workers’ expectations.  As Boyd Fisher, employment manager at 
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op Era; that is, the acceptance of the principle of representation, and the formation of 
ompany unions’ to implement it in ways some employers could tolerate, and hoped to make 
eful.  In mid-June 1919 Walter Gordon Merritt of the League for Industrial Rights 
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distinguished non-union industrial relations in the 1920s from the first phase of the Open 
Sh
‘c
us
most disquieting fight … going on’ over the American worker’s demand ‘to have a share 
 determining the conditions under which he worked and make the rules under which he 
orked,’ but this was an opportunity as well as a crisis: ‘when you interpret the question at 
e bottom as to what labor is after, you find it is the same thing that the managers of industry 
ve been after -- a right to express in the fullest extent their industrial initiative.’  Cyrus 
cCormick, Jr, of International Harvester, agreed: ‘The most outstanding fact in modern 
dustrial relations is the desire of labor to have a voice in the control of those questions 
ich touch its own interest.’ Management, he added, must respond, not only from fear of the 
li nsequences of doing nothing but because it agreed with the principle.72 
The NICB remained faithful to the tradition of regarding Britain as a model for the 
nited States. Its report’s ‘major emphasis’ was ‘upon conditions in Great Britain, because 
e problems there are obviously most analogous to our own.’  Its investigators simply drew 
ferent lessons from those of the labor-liberals.  A key conclusion was that ‘Collective 
argaining, in the sense of group-bargaining and as contrasted with individual bargaining, 
d without the existence of unions.’  Ironically, the NICB even used the radical 
ndicalism of the Shop Stewards’ Movement, which seemed to some labor-liberal observers 
 be such a promising means of self-actualization for workers, to demonstrate the 
adequacy of official union structures and support its arguments for plant-based, union-free 
ployee representation like that pioneered by the Rockefeller firms. Such representation 
ould provide ‘an opportunity for employers and their employees to meet on matters of local 
d mutual concern.’ 
eans of communication between employers and workers is a practical necessity; 
tters of mutual interest necessarily arise for common consideration.  There must … 
machinery for discussion of the many questions sure to develop respecting shop 
ctices, grievances, wages, hours, and the like.  Hence the natural development of 
e body which would represent the workers in conference with the managers 
arding affairs in the shops.  This need arises even where the employer is dealing 
ctly with his own men without interference from outside influences.73  
-placed advisors to American business reached the same conclusion, which 
 e Committee) developed: one which ‘assures unity of interest and co-operation on 
e part of all directly concerned’ without the ‘distinctly unAmerican’ enforcement of 
ionization that he said Whitleyism required.  It would be flexible, adaptable to America’s 
eat variety of industrial conditions, simple, direct, and free of government supervision.  It 
ould only include ‘representatives who are employees themselves, and hence…vitally 
ested in the company’s success.’  It would build on already established institutions – the 
kefeller plan and its imitators, including the employee representation schemes devised by 
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e first of a series of articles in  outlining the stark choice facing 
business: 
e employers in our country are where the English employers were decades ago, 
 are therefore afforded a fortunate glimpse into the future which awaits them and 
nation if they follow the same course.  Will they not profit by this and endeavor to 
ate a factory solidarity more attractive than class solidarity?  Will they not 
vince the workers by actual demonstration that they can gain more through co-
ration with their individual employers than by the militant, anti-social methods of 
ss conflict?  ….  The chance still remains in this country to avoid the English 
by erecting an industrial government wherein associated activities beyond 
 walls of the individual factory and intercorporate adjustments affecting labor will 
largely conducted by delegates from the factory rather than national organizations 
mployers and employees.74 
merican employers had found their answer to Whitleyism: their own form of industrial 
mocracy.  They would continue to cite British experience in support of this preventive 
orm, but wholly negatively.  J. Laurence Laughlin put their argument most amusingly, 
ing for a broad middle-class audience in August 1919 – ‘If we should be asked to follow 
e example of Great Britain in her labor experiments, it would be much as if a person filled 
ith emulation at the success of a menagerie should borrow for his private use a lion which 
ould be certain to eat him up.’75 Herbert Rice, Treasurer of General Motors, who had been 
 employer member of the NWLB, agreed: ‘I, for one, don't want to see the English system 
troduced in this country.  England's industrial success can hardly be held up to us for 
ulation. . . . Conditions are absolutely different.’ 
Rice explained how different in support of the Joint Co
emocracy that he and unnamed associates (later to become kn
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doe t on a dead level classification.  In England things are certainly 
different.  
At
. And it would suit a country ‘where the status of the workingman is not fixed and 
mited advancement is open to him according to his ability.’ 
American workman apparently doesn't care to be unionized.  If he did, anything 
manufacturer did to try to keep him out of the unions would be of no avail.  He 
s the independence and he doesn't join readily.  He is willing to co-operate, yes, 
he prefers to stand on his own feet.  He likes the idea of being paid by premium or 
ce work and bonus systems and getting paid according to his production.  He 
sn't want to ge
76
 every point Rice, speaking for the SCC, used the incomparability of British and American 
nditions as a way of specifying what American employers should do.  In the above address 
the National Association of Employment Managers, he presented a program for business -- 
t simply in devising plans to deal with the labor relations crisis company by company, but 
 confronting, head on, the last feeble challenge from a disintegrating Wilson Administration 
the restoration of a union-free environment. 
co
to 
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* * * 
In October 1919, an Industrial Conference met in Washington, with labor, business, and 
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re ison, AFL 
Secretary-Treasurer, cited the ‘evidence’ of the Department of Labor’s commission to focus 
ublic’ representatives (ironically including Rockefeller), called by President Wilson to 
tch together an industrial truce while the Great Steel Strike was raging – hardly an 
spicious time. The task was hopeless from the start.  American employers knew by then 
actly what they wanted, and there was no effective pressure on them to settle for anything 
ss.  As their group spokesman said, they ‘came to the conference with a program of 
rial relations’ drafted by the NICB in which Merritt’s was the central principle: ‘The 
blishment as a productive unit’ was its basis.77  A voluntarist, decentralized, and 
plicitly union-free industrial relations system was all they would accept.  Cleverly, they 
nt labor’s appeal for a practical right for American workers to join a union of their own 
oosing, and have it recognized by their employers, into their old spectre of state-enforced 
mpulsory unionization, choosing the grounds on which to resist confident that the judiciary 
d most of the middle-class public would join them there.   
In vain, labor’s spokesmen appealed to British precedent, and called for union 
cognition as the best way of managing workers’ discontent. Frank Morr
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 the central issue on which the Conference would break down: should employers be 
quired to recognize their workers’ independent unions as the exclusive channel of 
presentation and communication?  ‘[E]mployers in Great Britain generally recognize the 
sirability of bargaining collectively with labor.  [They] nearly all agree that collective 
rgaining should always be undertaken between associations of employers under (sic) 
gularly established and recognized trade-unions.’  In Britain’s Whitley-style joint councils 
mployers are required to deal with men or groups of men not in their employ and not 
osen from among their employees.’  Leaving aside whether what he said was true, it cut 
solutely no ice.  As the best metaphor in the NCF Commission’s report emphasized, there 
as no longer any reason to believe ‘that medicine good for the bull is good for the eagle.’78 
The Conference foundered when the employer delegation insisted on the Open Shop, 
ith company unionism established alongside of independent unionism as an equally 
gitimate -- and their preferred -- means of employee representation if managers and 
orkers in individual establishments wanted it.  American employers had made up their 
nds, which they expressed in a language of confident exceptionalism.  As NICB chairman 
ederick Fish, former president of AT&T, put it, the ‘open’ or ‘American shop’ was ‘an 
merican institution of the highest character,’ and was thus ‘the only institution … which we 
ally can ... support, as American citizens.’ Homer Ferguson of Newport News Shipbuilding, 
eaking for the Chamber of Commerce section of a united employer delegation, emphasized 
at ‘to establish a condition, whether it is established in England, in Sweden, or any other 
ace, whereby a man may not work freely without coercion, without being interfered with, is 
ablish an un-American condition, and is to set up a power that, in course of time, will 
volve us in the troubles of old countries and by that power even we may lose our 
presentative system of government.’79   
The conference collapsed, the steel strike was fought to a brutal but victorious finish, and 
e American Plan was launched.  A fifty-year perio
ounds and political persuasions had thought they could learn from Britain’s industrial 
perience ended because American employers – who had studied it closely, and learned 
ir own lessons – had constructed their own system which was so ‘exceptional’ that 
parisons were no longer either necessary, possible, or useful.   
* * * 
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is article’s conclusion must display a proper modesty.  American employers did not build 
e Open Shop order in the early 1900s, and then defend and strengthen it after the First 
orld War, because of their interpretation of the British model.  They had all the resources 
ey needed close to hand, more than sufficient power, and a uniquely favourable 
vironment.  Instead, the argument must be that the non-union, employer-controlled, 
latively state-free industrial relations system – the key element in ‘American 
ceptionalism’ – was a project to be worked for, not a fact to be taken for granted.  The 
or problem was bitterly contested terrain for three generations of Americans, and 
ployer participants in this long debate, just as much as their labor-liberal adversaries, do 
t seem to have spoken or acted as if the outcome was foreordained, or as if other nations’ 
perience had nothing to teach them.  Americans, particularly those of a liberal-labor 
rsuasion, continued to peer into the future of their own industrial relations system with the 
d of a distorted British mirror years after America was institutionally and ideologically 
ceptional that, logically, nobody else's experience could be very useful model. This article 
demonstrated that American employers too looked across the Atlantic; but, increasingly, 
hat they found there was a future to avoid, and important lessons about what not to do.  
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